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Abstract
This paper uses a range of structural VARs to show that the response of US stock prices to
scal shocks changed in 1980. Over the period 1955-1980 an expansionary spending or revenue
shock was associated with modestly higher stock prices. After 1980, along with a decline in
the scal multiplier, the response of stock prices to the same shock became negative and larger
in magnitude. We use an estimated DSGE model to show that this change is consistent with
a switch from an economy characterised by active scal policy and passive monetary policy
to one where scal policy was passive and the central bank acted aggressively in response to
inationary shocks.
Key words: Fiscal policy shocks, Stock prices, VAR, DSGE.
JEL codes: C5, E1, E5, E6
1 Introduction
Central banks around the world have tried to counter the impact of the Great Recession by resort-
ing to ultra-low interest rates and unconventional monetary policy. However, the e¤ectiveness of
unconventional policy in supporting the real economy has been questioned in the recent literature.
For example, in a panel study Gambacorta et al. (2014) conclude that in order to bring about a
signicant monetary stimulus a massive expansion of central banks balance sheets is required. In
contrast, there is some evidence that such policies may have a signicant impact on asset prices
such as stock prices (see Swanson (2015b)), with possible adverse consequences for the distribution
of income and consumption (see Mumtaz and Theophilopoulou (2016)).
If it is indeed the case that unconventional monetary policy inuences asset prices without a
large impact on the aggregate economy, then the case for reconsidering the role of scal policy
becomes stronger. This consideration makes it important to investigate the transmission of scal
policy shocks to the real economy and asset prices.
As far as the real e¤ects of scal policy are concerned, there is an extensive and growing
literature on estimating the multiplier of US output to government spending and taxation shocks.
Recent examples include Mertens and Ravn (2014) and Mertens and Ravn (2013) who build on
Any views expressed are solely those of the author(s) and so cannot be taken to represent those of the Bank of
England or to state Bank of England policy. This paper should therefore not be reported as representing the views





earlier contributions of Mountford and Uhlig (2009), Ramey (2011) and Blanchard and Perotti
(2002) amongst numerous others and show that these shocks have a signicant impact. Papers
such as Perotti (2005), however, have shown that the scal multipliers have declined in magnitude
after 1980.
The issue of the transmission of scal shocks to asset prices such as stock prices has received far
less attention from the empirical side. Two recent contributions include Afonso and Sousa (2011)
and Chatziantoniou et al. (2013). Using an an extended version of the Vector Autoregression (VAR)
of Blanchard and Perotti (2002), they show that positive (negative) shocks to government spending
(taxes) lead to a fall (rise) in stock prices in the US. However, Afonso and Sousa (2011) do not
include any proxy for monetary policy in their VAR model, an omission criticised by Chatziantoniou
et al. (2013).1 These authors examine the impact of government spending on an expanded version
of the VAR used by Afonso and Sousa (2011). The nd that over the period spanning 1991 to 2010,
Government spending shocks appear to have little impact on real and nancial variables. However,
their relatively small sample excludes important innovations in scal variables during the 1970s
and the early 1980s and it is unclear if their conclusions are robust to using a longer span of data.
The current paper extends this literature along three dimensions. First, we provide VAR results
on the transmission of US government and taxation shocks to real stock prices that are robust across
di¤erent shock identication schemes, thus departing from earlier papers that use one method of
identifying scal shocks. Second and more importantly, we show that there is a change in the sign
and magnitude of the response of stock prices to scal shocks after 1980 expansionary scal policy
shocks were associated with a modest increase in the stock price before 1980, while after this date the
same policy is associated with large declines. Although previous papers have documented a decline
in the magnitude of the scal multiplier across these sub-samples, to our knowledge, our study is
the rst to highlight the change in the response of stock prices to scal shocks. Finally, in order to
explain the possible source of the change in the response of stock prices, we present a DSGE model
following Traum and Yang (2011), we augment the model developed by Christiano et al. (2005)
and Smets and Wouters (2007) with a simple non-productive government sector. Estimation of
this DSGE model pre and post-1980 reveals important changes in the behaviour of policy makers.
In particular, we estimate that monetary policy was passive and scal policy was active during
the period between 1955Q4 and 1979Q4. The lack of su¢ cient response to ination by monetary
authorities caused ination expectations to rise after an expansionary scal shock resulting in a
decrease in the real interest rate. As a consequence, investment and consumption rose pushing
up equity prices. After 1980, our results suggest that both monetary and scal authorities set
policy in a manner that was consistent with their objectives of stabilising ination and public debt,
respectively. These policies suppressed ination expectations after an expansionary scal shock,
causing the real rate to rise and equity prices to fall. While previous research has highlighted
the possibility of changes in scal and monetary policy activism (see Leeper (1991) and Bianchi
and Ilut (2014)), our paper shows that this shift may be a factor behind the changing response of
stock prices to scal shocks. Therefore, our paper contributes to the literature linking changes in
policy to the stock market (see Blanchard (1981) for a seminal paper and Galí and Gambetti (2015)
for a recent analysis). While the focus of Galí and Gambetti (2015) is on the changing e¤ects of
monetary policy shocks, our contribution is to show that the impact of scal shocks on the stock
market has been subject to a large shift.
The paper is organised as follows: The empirical results based on VAR models are presented
in section 2. Section 3 introduces the theoretical model and discusses the parameter estimates.
Section 4 concludes.
1Using a panel regression, Ardagna (2009) report similar resultsstock prices rise around periods of scal tightening.
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2 Empirical Analysis
We estimate the following VAR model for the United States:




where var (vt) = 
. Yt is a N  T matrix of endogenous variables while  t is matrix of exogenous
variables included in the specication. The benchmark model includes the following seven endoge-
nous variable: (1) Real per-capita government spending (Gt), (2) Real per-capita GDP (Yt), (3)
CPI ination (t), (4) Real per-capita government revenue (Tt), (5) a short-term interest rate (Rt),
(6) the 10-year government bond yield (It) and (7) real stock prices (St). All variables except ina-
tion and the interest rates are included in log levels. Following, Perotti (2005), the scal variables
are dened net of transfers and interest payments (see section 2.2). After 2008 Q4, Rt is proxied by
the shadow interest rate estimated by Wu and Xia (2014). This provides a simple way to account
for the zero lower bound (ZLB). We also verify below that our results are robust to truncating the
sample before 2008. The exogenous variables in the model include a constant, a linear trend, a
quadratic trend and a dummy variable for 1975Q2 (see Blanchard and Perotti (2002)).
2.1 Identication of scal shocks
The covariance matrix of reduced form shocks 
 can be decomposed as 
 = A0A00. We use four
approaches to estimate the contemporaneous impact matrix A0 and identify government spending
and taxation shocks. Our starting point is a simple recursive strategy as described in Caldara
and Kamps (2008). The ordering of the variables is as listed above with the implication that
government spending is not a¤ected contemporaneously by macroeconomic or nancial shocks but
taxes respond immediately to shocks to Gt; Yt and t i.e. innovations that may a¤ect tax receipts.
Both scal shocks are assumed to a¤ect the fast moving variables, i.e. interest rates and stock
prices, immediately. The second identication strategy follows the procedure devised in Blanchard
and Perotti (2002) and extended to systems involving nominal variables in Perotti (2005). Their
method involves using external information to calibrate the output, ination and interest rate
elasticity of government spending and taxation. Perotti (2005) estimates the output and ination
elasticity of taxes to be 1:85 and 1:25 respectively.2 The output elasticity of government spending
is set to zero as Gt is dened net of transfers and not a¤ected by business cycle uctuations
contemporaneously. The ination elasticity of Gt is set to  0:5. Perotti (2005) argues that an
increase in ination leads to a reduction in wages of government employees in real terms. As wages
form a large proportion of spending, the elasticity is negative. As Gt and Tt are dened net of
interest payments, their interest elasticity is set to zero. As in the recursive scheme, we also assume
that Gt and Tt do not react contemporaneously to shocks to the long-term interest rate and stock
prices. These restrictions, together with the assumption that spending decisions precede decisions
on taxes results in an identied structural VAR (SVAR). The third identication scheme is based on
the seminal work of Mountford and Uhlig (2009) who use sign restrictions to identify spending and
revenue shocks. Following these authors, positive shocks to these variables are assumed to increase
spending and revenue for four quarters. In addition, these shocks are assumed to be orthogonal to
a business cycle shock that moves taxes and output in the same direction for four quarters. The
nal identication scheme relies on narrative measures of tax and spending shocks. These proxies
2Perotti (2005) also provides the estimates of these elasticities pre and post-1980. We also use these sub-sample
estimates in our application of this model.
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can be added to the VAR directly or used as external instruments to estimate the appropriate
column of A0 (see Stock and Watson (2008)). Mertens and Ravn (2012) have recently introduced a
rened version of the tax shock estimated by Romer and Romer (2010). Romer and Romer (2010)
build their shock measure by purging legislated tax changes from movement that are endogenous
and driven by policy makersconcerns about growth. However, Mertens and Ravn (2012) argue
that the Romer and Romer (2010) tax shock may not satisfy exogeneity as the proxy does not
account for implementation lags. Mertens and Ravn (2012) propose a proxy based on exogenous
tax changes where legislation and implementation are less than a quarter apart. In related work,
Ramey (2011) proposes a measure for news in government defence spending, an estimate of the
expected discounted value of Gt due to foreign political events. We use the Mertens and Ravn
(2012) measure of tax changes as an instruments in a proxy SVAR to identify unanticipated tax
shocks. In addition we attempt to capture anticipated changes in spending by using the Ramey
(2011) news measure as an instrument for the spending shock.
The estimation of these three SVAR models is now standard in the literature. We, therefore,
conne estimation details to the on-line technical appendix.
2.2 Data and estimation samples
We follow Perotti (2005) closely in dening government spending and net taxes. Government
spending is dened as the sum of government consumption and investment. Net taxes are calculated
as current receipts of the government less interest and transfer payments. Both variables are
deated by the GDP deator and divided by total population. A full description of data sources
and calculations is provided in Appendix A.
The benchmark sample runs from 1955Q1 to 2015Q4. When the Proxy VAR is employed the
sample is altered slightly. Data for the Mertens and Ravn (2012) instrument is available until
2006Q4, while the series constructed by Ramey (2011) runs until 2013Q4.
Perotti (2005) provides strong evidence that the transmission of scal shocks has changed after
1980. The estimates presented in Perotti (2005) suggest that the response of output to scal shocks
is smaller after 1980. Similar results are reported by Bilbiie et al. (2008) who suggest that a change
in monetary policy and asset market participation may have played a role. Given this evidence,
we estimate our models over the full sample and present results over the two sub-samples, before
and after 1979Q4. We show below that very similar results are obtained if, instead of splitting the
sample, we allow the parameters of the VAR to change over time.
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Figure 1: Percentage response to a Government Spending shock using the benchmark identication. The solid lines are median responses
while the shaded area is the 68% error band. The Y-Axis labels are as follows: (1) Real per-capita government spending (Gt), (2) Real
per-capita GDP (Yt), (3) CPI ination (t), (4) Real per-capita government revenue (Tt), (5) a short-term interest rate (Rt), (6) the
10-year treasury bill rate (It) and (7) real stock prices (St) The response of Y is expressed as a multiplier.
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Figure 2: Percentage response to a government revenue shock using the benchmark identication. The solid lines are median responses
while the shaded area is the 68% error band. The Y-Axis labels are as follows: (1) Real per-capita government spending (Gt), (2) Real
per-capita GDP (Yt), (3) CPI ination (t), (4) Real per-capita government revenue (Tt), (5) a short-term interest rate (Rt), (6) the
10-year treasury bill rate (It) and (7) real stock prices (St) The response of Y is expressed as a multiplier.
6
Figure 3: Policy experiments. DF refers to a decit nanced increase in G. BB refers to a balanced budget increase in G: DFTAX refers
to a decrease in T which decit nanced. The shaded area represents the horizon over which these restrictions are imposed.
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2.3 Results
2.3.1 Impulse response of stock prices to scal shocks
Figure 1 presents the response of the endogenous variables to a spending shock that raises G by 1%
using the recursive identication scheme. We treat these results as a simple benchmark and discuss
the estimates from the alternative identication schemes below. The response of Y is expressed in
terms of a dollar change in GDP as a ratio of a dollar change in spending. Over the full sample,
the output multiplier is estimated to be about 1.6 at the one year horizon, a magnitude consistent
with results reported in Perotti (2005). As in Perotti (2005), there is evidence for a decline in the
multiplier with the GDP response substantially less persistent in the post-1980 period. A similar
result holds for ination and the short-term interest rate while these variables rise on impact
during the pre-1980 period, the hypothesis of a zero response cannot be rejected in the post-1980
period. The short-term interest rate declines in response to the shock in all three sub-samples
providing further support for the estimates in Perotti (2005). In contrast, the short-term increase
in the It is larger in the post-1980 period. Over both sub-samples, the initial increase in spending
is not matched by a correponding rise in tax revenue. This aspect is more apparent in the second
sub-sample where taxes show a decline in response to the shock.3 Over the full sample, real stock
prices show a persistent decline in response to this shock. However this hides a substantial change
across the two subsamples. In the pre-1980 period, stock prices increase by about 1% at the 6
month horizon. In contrast, the response in the post-1980 period is characterised by a protracted
decline which reaches about 3% at the one year horizon. The last row of Figure 2 shows that the
stock price response to tax shocks also displays substantial variation across the two sub-samples.
Before 1980, stock prices show a modest decline in response to a rise in taxes. After 1980, the
response switches sign and stock prices rise by 0.5%. The remaining responses display the pattern
reported in earlier studies such as Perotti (2005) for e.g. the response of output shows a decline
in magnitude, with the drop in output in response to tax shocks reversing within two quarters after
1980.
3We consider policy experiments below where either G or T is held xed.
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Figure 4: The response of real stock prices to a 1% increase in government spending. The proxy SVAR uses the spending shock of Ramey
(2011) as an instrument.
9
Figure 5: The response of real stock prices to a 1% increase in government revenue. The proxy SVAR uses the Mertens and Ravn (2012)
tax shock as an instrument.
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Policy experiments The impulse responses in gures 1 and 2 report results for purescal
shocks where the time-path of the scal variables is left unconstrained. In the current application,
this implies that the behaviour of taxes (spending) can di¤er across sub-samples after a spending
(tax) shock. To check if the results are sensitive to this feature, we follow Mountford and Uhlig
(2009) and consider three policy experiments which constrain the path of the scal variables. First,
we consider a spending shock that is decit nanced this shock increases spending by one percent
for a year while taxes are constrained to remain at zero. The second policy experiment considers
a balanced budget rise in spending  i.e. a spending increase of one percent for one year that is
matched by a rise in taxes of 1:2 percent.4 Finally we consider a tax cut that is decit nanced 
taxes fall by one percent for one year while there is no change in spending. As shown in Mountford
and Uhlig (2009), these responses can be calculated by choosing the scale of the G and T shocks
which delivers the scenarios set out above.
Figure 3 shows the key results from these three experiments. Consider the top three rows which
show the impact of a decit nanced increase in spending as indicated by the shaded area, G
is constrained to be at 1% over the rst year of the horizon while T remains at zero. The third
row displays the response of stock prices and shows that even when these assumptions are imposed
on the two sub-samples, the response of stock prices displays the same shift as indicated by the
benchmark in the post-1980 period stock prices fall while they appear to increase in the earlier
sub-sample. The next three rows of the gure show the experiment based on a balanced budget
increase in G. Again, these assumptions do not alter the conclusions with respect to the change
in the response of stock prices across the two sub-samples. Finally, the last three rows show the
impact of the decit nanced tax cut. Before 1980, this policy is associated with a mild increase
in stock prices. In contrast, stock prices fall in response to this policy change after 1980. These
results support those estimated under the pure tax shock scenario shown in gure 2.
Alternative identication schemes The estimated change in the response of stock prices
across the two sub-samples is robust to di¤erent methods of identifying innovations to spending and
revenue. Figures 4 and 5 present the response of stock prices when the shocks are identied using:
(1) the Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and Perotti (2005) scheme, (2) sign restrictions scheme of
Mountford and Uhlig (2009) and (3) external instruments in a proxy SVAR. Consider the response
to spending shocks shown in Figure 4. The full sample results suggest that the median response
of stock prices is negative over, at least, the rst year of the horizon, with the most precise results
generated by the proxy SVAR and the VAR with sign restrictions. However, as in the benchmark
model, the full sample results hide a substantial amount of time-variation. In the pre-1980 period,
the evidence for a negative response of stock prices is muted. In contrast after 1980, all the SVARs
indicate that stock prices decline in response to this shock.
Figure 5 shows that, one average across the sample, a contractionary tax shock is associated
with an increase in stock prices. However, this positive impact is missing (or very short-lived, as in
the case of the VAR with sign restrictions) in the pre-1980 period, with the response estimated to
be strongly negative in some cases. After 1980, however, there is strong evidence that stock prices
rise with a magnitude ranging from 0.5% to 2%.5
Further sensitivity analysis We carry out a number of further checks to investigate the ro-
bustness of the result that the response of stock prices to scal shocks has changed over time.
4The percent rise in G and T reect the fact that the share of these variables in GDP is approximately 0.2 and
0.16, respectively.
5The proxy SVAR is estimated using a sample that is nishes in 2006Q4. The fact that the results from this
model are close to benchmark suggests that the Great Recession period is not crucial in driving the main results.
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Information set First, we consider the possibility of omitted variable bias by trying to ac-
count for shocks that may be important for the US economy. In order to preserve degrees of
freedom, we add the additional endogenous variables one at a time to the benchmark model which
uses the the recursive identication. These variables are ordered after the scal indicators.
A large number of recent papers have highlighted the role of uncertainty shocks in driving US
macroeconomic and nancial variables. To account for this we add the uncertainty index proposed
by Jurado et al. (2015) to the benchmark model. The top row of Figure 11 in Appendix B shows that
the estimated temporal change in the response of stock prices to scal shocks is largely una¤ected
by this change in model specication. While the pre-1980 response of stock prices to spending and
revenue shocks is imprecisely estimated, S falls in response to G shocks and rises on impact in
response to T shocks during the post-1980 period.
Following Favero and Giavazzi (2007), we next consider if adding a measure of government debt
to the VAR changes the results. The second row of Figure 11 suggests that the estimated change
in the response of stock prices pre and post-1980 survives the addition of this variable.
Castelnuovo and Surico (2010) have shown that time-variation in the estimated impact of mone-
tary policy can be a¤ected by the addition of measures of expectations in the VAR model. However
when we add the Michigan survey measure of consumer sentiment to the model, the estimated re-
sponse of stock prices still displays the time-variation detected in the benchmark model (see third
row of Figure 11). Next, we add real oil prices to the benchmark model to account for oil shocks
in the earlier part of the sample. The fourth row of Figure 11 again shows that the benchmark
results are preserved.
The benchmark model does not necessarily account for scal news or anticipated scal shocks.
While we try to tackle this issue by using the Ramey (2011) measure of scal news as an instrument
in the proxy SVAR, papers such as Rossi and Zubairy (2011) pursue a di¤erent approach and add the
scal news measure as an exogenous variable in a recursive VAR in order to lterthe spending
shock. The fth row of Figure 11 shows that when we adopt this approach and add the scal
news measure as an additional exogenous variable in the benchmark model, the benchmark results
survive. This suggests that estimated response of stock prices to proxies for both anticipated and
unanticipated spending shocks shows a very similar temporal pattern.
Time-variation The benchmark results are based on splitting the sample in 1979Q4 as in
Perotti (2005). The results from this simple approach are supported by a more sophisticated version
of the benchmark recursive VAR that allows for time-varying parameters and stochastic volatility
àla Primiceri (2005). As the model contains a large number of endogenous variables and lags,
estimation is carried out using the algorithm proposed in Koop and Potter (2011). The sixth row
of Figure 11 presents the cumulated time-varying response of stock prices at the 2 year horizon
to 1 unit increase in spending and revenue, respectively. The gure re-enforces the point that, on
average after 1980, the response of S to G and T shocks was substantially di¤erent when compared
to the pre-1980 period.
Trends Following the literature, we allow for a linear and quadratic trend in the benchmark
specication. The nal row of Figure 11, instead, presents the cumulated responses from a version
of the benchmark model where the variables are rst-di¤erenced. As in the benchmark model,
stock prices fall in response to spending shocks and rise in response to tax shocks in the post-1980
period. In the pre-1980 period, there is evidence that tax shocks reduce stock prices on impact,
while spending shocks have a negligible impact.
To summarise, the impulse response analysis from the numerous VAR models considered above
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suggests two main conclusions:
1. In the pre-1980 period, when scal shocks had their largest impact on the real economy, their
e¤ect on real stock prices appears to be weak. While there is a suggestion that the median
response of S to expansionary scal shocks is positive, it is hard to reject the null hypothesis
of a zero response in most VAR models we estimate.
2. In the post-1980 period, when the scal mutiplier declined, the impact of scal shocks on
stock prices increased in magnitude and appeared to change sign. In fact, there is strong
evidence that after 1980 expansionary scal shocks lead to a reduction in stock prices.
13
Figure 6: The percentage contribution of spending and revenue shocks to the forecast error variance
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Figure 7: Real stock prices relative to VAR implied trend. The black line is actual data while the
red line is the counter-factual estimate under the scenario that only G and T shocks are active.
The grey-shaded areas represent NBER recession dates.
2.3.2 The contribution of scal shocks to stock prices
Figure 6 shows the estimated contribution of the scal shocks to the forecast error variance (FEV)
of the endogenous variables using the benchmark VAR model. At the one year horizon, scal shocks
contribute about 17% to the FEV of GDP. However, as in the case of impulse responses the results
change over time. In particular, the contribution of scal shocks to GDP is substantially smaller in
the post-1980 period. The same decline can be see in the contribution of these shocks to ination
and the interest rates. However, in contrast, the contribution of these shocks to stock price FEV
has increased after 1980. In the pre-1980 period, this contribution was about 7% at the one-year
horizon reaching a maximum of 12% in the long-run. After 1980 the scal shocks contributed 11%
at the one-year horizon with the contribution rising close to 20% in the long-run.
A similar picture emerges when the historical decomposition of stock prices is considered. Fig-
ure 7 presents stock prices relative to trend and the counter-factual estimate of S assuming only
spending and revenue shocks are active. The gure presents this decomposition using the bench-
mark VAR estimated in the two sub-samples with the vertical line indicating the sample split.
First, it is clearly evident that the historical contribution of scal shocks is smaller in the pre-1980
period. The period following the 1981 Reagan tax cut coincides with a negative contribution of
scal shocks with these e¤ects reversed with the tax increases in 1982. Similarly, the tax increases
of the early 1990s under the the Omnibus Budget reconciliation acts are associated with a positive
contribution to stock prices. Fiscal shocks make a modest negative contribution during the Bush
tax cuts in early 2000s. It is interesting to note that the scal expansion associated with the stimu-
lus acts 2008-2010 coincided with a large negative contribution of scal shocks to S. These results
re-enforce the conclusions reached above via impulse response analysis after 1980 expansionary
scal shocks are increasingly associated with a reduction in stock prices.
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3 Explaining the change. A DSGE model
Why is the response of stock prices to scal shocks di¤erent after 1980? We attempt to answer this
question using an estimated DSGE model As in Traum and Yang (2011), we augment the model
developed by Christiano et al. (2005) and Smets and Wouters (2007) with a simple non-productive
government sector. In this section we present a description of the key features of this model. A
complete description of each sector is provided in the technical appendix to the paper.
3.1 Key features of the model
The model features monopolistically competitive households who consume, supply labour and cap-
ital services. As in Erceg et al. (2000), the household supplies a di¤erentiated labour service to
the production section. They set their nominal wage and supply any amount of labour demanded
by the rms at that wage rate. In each period, a fraction of households receive a random signal
and they are allowed to reset wages optimally while all other households can only partially index
their wages to past ination. The rm sector in the model consists of a continuum of intermediate
producers that employ labour and capital services to produce the intermediate good for sale to
the nal producer. Intermediate producers operate in two stages: First, they take wage and rental
rate of capital as given and decide about labour and capital demand by maximising their prots.
Second, they decide about what price to charge with a fraction of rms allowed to reset their price
each period. The government sector consists of a scal authority and a monetary authority. Fiscal
authorities nance government consumption and transfers by raising revenues from taxation and
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Here, ~Bt denotes government debt,  t is the tax rate, RGt is the e¤ective interest rate faced by




, ~Wt is wage, Lt denotes hours worked, t is
ination, while ~Gt andgTRt denote government consumption and transfers, respectively.6Debt and













where ~Yt is output. Government consumption evolves as a stationary exogenous process.
As discussed in Leeper (1991), a scal authority is characterised as passivewhen it sets taxes
in a way that restores debt back to its steady state value. In the rule given by equation 2, this
is achieved by setting  greater than
 
   1 where  is the householdstime discount factor and
  is steady state productivity. When authoritiestax reaction function does not satisfy the latter
condition ( <
 
   1), then they actively destabilise the debt.













6Non stationary variables are denoted by the superscript ~. Variables without a time subscript are steady state
values.
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Monetary policy is considered as passive if the reaction of the policy rate to changes in the ination
is not strong enough to stabilise ination expectations ( < 1). When  > 1 monetary policy
is viewed as active as it guarantees that long run ination expectations coincide with the ination
target.
Following Swanson (2015a), an equity security in the model is dened as a levered claim on
the aggregate consumption. Every period, the equity security pays a dividend equal to c#t where #






where mt is the stochastic discount factor.
3.1.1 Estimation
We estimate the parameters of the model using Bayesian techniques. As in the case of the SVARs,
the estimation is carried out on two sub-samples. The rst sub-sample ranges from 1955 Q1 to
1979 Q4. The second sub-sample runs from 1980 Q1 to 2007 Q4. As the model does not directly
account for the ZLB and unconventional policies, we restrict the second sub-sample to 2007. While
adding these features to the model is an interesting task in general, it is not central to the aim of
explaining the change in the response of stock prices to scal shocks in 1980.
The sample is split in 1980 to match the SVAR analysis. However, there are many studies in
the literature (Traum and Yang (2011), Leeper et al. (2015), Kliem et al. (2016) among others)
that adopt a very similar sub-sample analysis to investigate simultaneous changes in the preferences
of both scal and monetary authorities. Furthermore, the studies of Bianchi and Ilut (2014) and
Bianchi and Melosi (2017) seem to justify empirically a very similar split of the data. Their
methodology allows the policy parameters to evolve stochastically from one regime to another.
Although the process that drivesthese switches is unobserved, it can be inferred from the data
by using ltering techniques. This analysis reveals that the time period of changes in the policy
parameters seems to coincide with the split of the sample adopted in the literature.
As described in detail in the technical appendix, we follow Del Negro and Schorfheide (2008)
(among others) and use priors that are formed endogenously. In other words, the priors for the
parameters (which are based on common choices in the literature) are conditioned on beliefs about
data moments of interest. In our application these moments are impulse responses to government
spending shocks and the beliefs are centered on the estimates obtained from the benchmark SVAR
model. As shown above, the SVAR results are robust across numerous permutations of the empir-
ical model and the approach of Del Negro and Schorfheide (2008) allows us to incorporate this
information into the DSGE estimation thus ameliorating the e¤ect of the short data span in the
two sub-samples. The technical appendix shows that the key results are robust to the degrees of
tightness of the prior distribution.
3.2 Results
The posterior estimates of the model parameters reveal a very interesting pattern of policy changes.
The 90% highest posterior density interval (HPDI) for the parameter governing monetary policy
activism, , is estimated to be (0:37; 0:6) in the rst sub-sample and monetary policy is passive.
After 1980, there is strong evidence in favour of more active policy with the HPDI rising to (1:5; 1:9).
In contrast, we estimate that scal policy is passive in the second sub-sample: The 90% HPDI for
 is estimated to be (0:03; 0:08) while
 
  1 = 0:02. Evidence for scal policy activism is stronger
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before 1980 with the HPDI of  estimated to be (0:003; 0:02) and
 
   1 = 0:02. The posterior
estimates of the remaining parameters fall well in the range reported in the literature (Christiano
et al. (2005), Smets and Wouters (2007), Justiniano et al. (2010), Del Negro et al. (2015) among
others) and are described in the technical appendix.
3.2.1 Impulse responses and variance decomposition
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Figure 8: Pre-1980 estimates of the response to a government spending shock. The solid line represents the pointwise median impulse
response function, and the shaded area is the corresponding 5th and 95th percentiles of the posterior distribution. The horizontal axes
are in quarters, the vertical axes are in percentage points. The multiplier is dened as Mi = YG
G^i
Y^i
, and the present value multiplier is












. The superscript ^ denotes deviations from steady state.
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Figure 9: Post-1980 estimates of the response to a government spending shock. See notes to gure 8.
20
Figure 10: Contribution of the government spending shock to the FEV of equity prices. The bottom panel shows the posterior distribution
of the di¤erence in the post and pre-1980 contribution.
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Figures 8 and 9 present the estimated response to a government spending shock in the two sub-
samples. Consider the pre-1980 results. A passive monetary authority allows ination expectations
to rise after a positive government spending shock and the real real interest rate declines. A lower
real interest rate implies higher consumption and investment demand with an output multiplier
that is greater than 1 at the two year horizon. Private demand is boosted further by the fact that
scal authorities react to government debt only weakly. As discussed in Leeper et al. (2015), the
latter e¤ect is small as the existence of steady state taxes ensures that the tax revenue increases
along with the expansion of the real economy and this reduces the wealth e¤ects induced by active
scal authorities. Given high aggregate consumption and low real rates after the shock, equity
prices rise.
The post-1980 estimates are a mirror image of the pre-1980 results. In this regime, both
authorities set policy in a manner that it is consistent with their objectives. However, as these
policies are uncoordinated, any stimulatory e¤ect from a government spending shock is cancelled out
by the higher real rates and higher taxes. As a result, the output multiplier is substantially smaller
in this regime. Note that as the real interest rate rises and consumption falls, the expansionary
spending shock causes the equity price to decline by a substantial amount.
Figure 10 shows that in symmetry with the SVAR results, the DSGE estimates suggest that
the contribution of scal shocks to equity prices has increased after 1980, rising by about 10%,
Furthermore, the second row of the gure shows that this change is systematic and the null of
stability can be rejected.
3.2.2 Discussion
In summary, the posterior estimates of the DSGE model provide one compelling explanation for
the SVAR results. We nd that the fall in equity prices in response to expansionary scal shocks
estimated after 1980 may be a manifestation of the activism of monetary authorities over a period
of passive scal policy. Before 1980, monetary policy is estimated to be passive while the posterior
estimates of the tax rule point to higher degree of scal activism. As a result, expansionary scal
shocks over this period were associated with modest increases in equity prices.
These results are of relevance to the recent discussion about the switch from the passive mon-
etary & active scal policy to active monetary & passive scal policy regime in papers such as
Bianchi and Ilut (2014) and Bianchi and Melosi (2017) . Our ndings are consistent with the
results of Bianchi and Ilut (2014) and Bianchi and Melosi (2017) even though we apply a very
di¤erent methodology. Futhermore, our results contribute to the literature regarding the Great
moderation and policy switches (Lubik and Schorfheide (2004), Sims and Zha (2006), Cogley and
Sargent (2005), Cogley et al. (2010)). The DSGE analysis provides important results on the size
of the scal multiplier. We show that an estimated Smets and Wouters (2007) type model can
deliver a multiplier greater than one without modelling features such long-run debt, rule of thumb
consumers and complementarity between government and private consumption (Bianchi and Ilut
(2014), Leeper et al. (2015), Bianchi and Melosi (2017)). Our analysis suggest that a scal ex-
pansion does not need to crowd out private demand if the real interest rate falls. This has direct
implications for central banks and it suggests that successful scal expansions require a high de-
gree of coordination between the two authorities. Finally, our results have implications for the
literature that uses asset prices to identify the e¤ects of policy actions (Wright (2012), Joyce et al.
(2011), Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2013)). Our study suggests that asset prices can increase after a
scal expansion that is not o¤set by monetary policy and this prediction can be used to infer the
e¤ectiveness of the policy announcement in real time.
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4 Conclusions
In this paper we use a battery of SVAR models to show that the response of US stock prices to an
expansionary scal shock has changed after 1980. Before this date, an expansionary scal shock
was associated with modest increases in stock prices. Post-1980, the same shock is associated with
large declines in stock prices with spending and revenue shocks making a larger contribution to the
forecast error variance.
We then use an estimated DSGE model to show this shift in the response can be explained by a
change in policy activism. The pre-1980 period is found to be characterised by active scal policy
and passive monetary policy. This policy mix allowed the real interest rate to fall after a scal
expansion boosting equity prices. After 1980 monetary policy is estimated to be active while the
scal authority is found to be passive. As a consequence positive scal shocks result in real interest
rate increases causing consumption and equity prices to decline.
These results have important policy implications. In particular, the analysis suggests that the
large increases in stock prices witnessed after the presidential election of 2016 might be reversed
if the new administration implements its plans for a scal expansion. This, again, highlights the
importance of the interaction between scal and monetary policy.
In future work it would be interesting to explore if the temporal shift documented in this paper
also apply to other developed countries such as the United Kingdom. It may also be useful to
investigate if scal shocks have economically signicant e¤ects on prices of other assets such as
homes and whether the estimated impact is stable through time.
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A Appendix A: Data sources
BEA refers to Bureau of Economic Analysis (http://www.bea.gov/), FRED is Federal Reserve
Economic data (http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/) and GFD refers to Global Financial Data.
Fiscal data
 Government spending: Government consumption expenditures and gross investment (BEA
Table 1.15 Line 22) divided by population and deated by the GDP deator.
 Net Taxes: Current Receipts (BEA Table 3.1 Line 1) minus current transfer payments (BEA
Table 3.1 Line 22) and interest payments (BEA Table 3.1 Line 27) divided by population and
deated by the GDP
 Government Debt: Federal Debt Held by the Public (FRED series id FYGFDPUN) divided
by nominal GDP.
 Tax shock calculated by Mertens and Ravn (2012).
Downloaded from https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/pol.4.2.145.
 News in government defence spending calculated by Ramey (2011).
Downloaded from http://econweb.ucsd.edu/~vramey/research.html#data.
Macroeconomic/Financial data
 Real GDP per capita: Real GDP (FRED series id GDPC96) divided by population.
 CPI (FRED series id CPIAUCSL). We calculate ination as the annual growth in CPI.
 3 month Treasury Bill rate (FRED series id TB3MS). From 2009Q1 to 2015Q4, we use the
shadow rate calculated by Wu and Xia (2014). This is obtained from the Federal Reserve
Bank of Atlanta.
 Real Stock Prices
 10-year government bond yield (GFD code IGUSA10D).
 Consumer Condence index: University of Michigan Consumer sentiment (FRED id UMC-
SENT and UMCSENT1).
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 Uncertainty index calculated by Jurado et al. (2015).
Dowloaded from https://www.sydneyludvigson.com/data-and-appendixes/.
 Population ( FRED series id POP)
 GDP deator (FRED series id GDPDEF)
B Appendix B: Robustness
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Figure 11: Sensitivity Analysis. Each row presents the response of S to spending and revenue shocks.
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1 SVAR Estimation
1.1 Recursive VAR, Blanchard and Perotti (2002) VAR and VAR with Sign Re-
strictions
Consider the reduced form VAR
Yt = αΓt +
P∑
j=1
βt−jYt−j + vt, var (vt) = Ω
where Γt is 1 ×M vector of exogenous regressors. We adopt a Bayesian approach to estimation of
the reduced form VAR model. We introduce a natural conjugate prior for the VAR parameters (see

















0M×NP IM × c
 (1)
where γ1 to γN denotes the prior mean for the coefficients on the first lag, τ is the tightness of
the prior on the VAR coefficients and c is the tightness of the prior on the constant terms. In our
application, the prior means are chosen as the OLS estimates of the coefficients of an AR(1) regression
estimated for each endogenous variable using a training sample. We set a loose prior, τ = 100000.
The scaling factors σi are set using the standard deviation of the error terms from these preliminary
AR(1) regressions. Finally we set c = 1/1000 in our implementation indicating a flat prior on the
∗Any views expressed are solely those of the author(s) and so cannot be taken to represent those of the Bank of
England or to state Bank of England policy. This paper should therefore not be reported as representing the views of the
















where µi denotes the sample means of the endogenous variables calculated using the training sam-
ple. As in Banbura et al. (2010), the tightness of this sum of coefficients prior is set as λ = 10τ .





) and Ω take a simple form and are defined as:
G (B |Ω) ∼ N(B∗,Ω⊗ (X∗′X∗)−1) (3)
G (Ω |B ) ∼ IW (S∗, T ∗). (4)
where X denotes the right hand side variables Γt, Yt−1, ..Yt−P . The posterior means are given by
B∗=(X∗′X∗)−1 (X∗′Y ∗) and S∗=(Y ∗−X∗)B˜′(Y ∗−X∗B˜) , where Y ∗=[Y ;YD,1;YD,2], X∗=[X;XD,1;XD,2]
and B˜ is the draw of the VAR coefficients B reshaped to be conformable with X∗. T ∗ denotes the
number of rows of Y ∗. A Gibbs sampler offers a convenient method to simulate the posterior dis-
tribution of B and Ω by drawing successively from these conditional posteriors. We employ 25,000
iterations using the last 5000 for inference.
Once the iterations are past the burn-in stage, we draw the contemporaneous impact matrix:
1.1.1 Recursive SVAR
In this case A0 = chol (Ω)
1.1.2 Blanchard and Perotti (2002) VAR
We add a random walk Metropolis Hastings step to draw A0. The structural VAR can be written as
1:
1 0 0.5 0 0 0 0
a1 1 0 a2 0 0 0
a3 a4 1 a5 0 0 0
0 −1.85 −1.25 1 0 0 0
a6 a7 a8 a9 1 0 0
a10 a11 a12 a13 a14 1 0













1The elasticities used in the two sub-samples are given in Perotti (2005).
2

b1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 b2 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 b3 0 0 0 0
b8 0 0 b4 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 b5 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 b6 0
































Let θ = (a1, a2, ...a20, b1, b2, ..b8). A candidate value of θ is drawn from
θnew = θold + ξ
where ξ˜N(0, c$) where $ is obtained is the inverse hessian of ln lik evaluated at the (local) maximum.
As we adopt flat priors, the draw is accepted if exp
(
ln lik (θnew)− ln lik (θold)) > U where U is a draw
of a standard uniform number. We adjust the scaling factor c to obtain an acceptance rate of about
40%. Note that A0 = A
−1B
1.1.3 Sign restrictions
This section explains briefly the identification scheme employed byMountford and Uhlig (2009). The
sign restrictions describe in Table 1 are imposed for four periods using the penalty function approach
developed by Uhlig (2005).
Table 1: Sing Restrictions
Variables Shocks
Government Spending Tax Business Cycle Monetary Policy
Government Spending +
GDP +
CPI inflation + -
Government Revenue + +
Short-Term Interest Rate + +
10-year Government Bond Yield
Real Stock Prices
Notes: All sing restrictions have been imposed for 4 periods.
As it has been discussed above the mapping between reduced and structural errors is given by
ωt = A0vt (5)
For any orthogonal matrix D (DD′ = I, where I is the identity matrix) the above mapping can be
written as
3






Using the companion form of the VAR(p) model, the impulse of variable j and the impulse of shock
i in the period h can be expressed as
IRFi,j(h) = JjB
h−1A0DJ ′i (8)
where Ji and Jh are selection matrices of zeros and ones.
In Uhlig (2005) the matrix D results from the following minimisation problem
























DD′ = I (10)
where σj is the standard deviation of variable j and f (x) =
{
100x if x ≥ 0
x otherwise
. Finally, I+ is the
index set of variables, for which identification of a given shock restricts the impulse response to be
positive and I− is the index set of variables, for which identification restricts the impulse response to
be negative.
1.2 Proxy SVAR
Stock and Watson (2008) and Mertens and Ravn (2014) have recently proposed a structural VAR
approach that uses proxy variables as instruments rather than additional endogenous variables. The




Bj Y˜t−p + A˜0ε˜t (11)
The vector of endogenous variables Y˜t does not contain the constructed measure of fiscal shocks directly
but, instead, this is used as an instrument to estimate the structural shock of interest εct . Denoting the
remaining shocks by ε˜•t , this approach requires the proxy for fiscal shocks εˆ
c
t to satisfy the following
conditions
E (εˆct , ε
c
t) = α 6= 0 (12)
E (εˆct , ε˜
•
t ) = 0
V AR (ε˜t) = D = diag (σε1t , ...σεNt)
4
The first expression in equation 12 states that the instrument εˆct is correlated with the structural shock
to be estimated, while the second expression rules out any correlation between εˆct and the remaining
structural shocks and establishes exogeneity of the instrument. The final condition ensures that the
shocks are contemporaneously uncorrelated. As shown in Stock and Watson (2008), Mertens and Ravn
(2013) and Mertens and Ravn (2014), these conditions along with the requirement that the structural
shocks ε˜t are contemporaneously uncorrelated can be used to derive a GMM estimator for the column
of A˜0 that corresponds to εˆ
c
t . Letting A˜0 = [A˜0,1....A˜0,N ] and A˜0ε˜t = ut where V AR (ut) = Ω. Then
Stock and Watson (2008) show that that ε1t can be estimated via a regression of εˆ
c



















 = A˜0,1α. Let Π denote the coefficient on ut.


































= [1, 0, ...0] and A˜−10 ut = εt.
Note that equation 12 imposes less stringent conditions on the quality of εˆct than those required for
unbiased estimation when the proxy variable is added directly to the VAR model. In particular, the
only requirements are that εˆct is correlated with the shock of interest and uncorrelated with other
shocks. These conditions can be satisfied even if εˆct is measured with error.
2 Model
This section reviews the theoretical model adopted in this study to understand the SVAR stylised facts
discussed in the previous section. As in Traum and Yang (2011), we augment the model developed
by Christiano et al. (2005) and Smets and Wouters (2007) with a simple non-productive government
sector so we can investigate the effects of a government spending shock on the macroeconomic variables.
2.1 Household




, supply labour (Lt) and capital















where β denotes the time discount factor, σL is the labour supply elasticity, h is the consumption
smoothing parameter and χt is a stationary labour supply shock.
2 Households choose how much to
2Non stationary variables are denoted with tilde (˜.).
5
consume and to work by maximising the above objective function subject to the following budget
constraint
C˜t + I˜t + B˜t = (1− τ t) W˜tLt + (1− τ t)RKt υtK˜t−1 − u (υt) K˜t−1 +
RGt−1B˜t−1
Πt
+ T˜Rt + Ξ˜t (15)
where W˜t stands for nominal wages, R
K
t is the rental rate of capital, υt is the degree of capital
utilisation, u(υ) is the cost of capital utilisation, RGt is the effective interest rate faced by households
RGt = Rtψt (16)
which is the policy rate times an exogenous risk premium (haircut type) shock (ψt) that captures
agents’ loses from investing on government debt (B˜t).
3 T˜Rt and Ξ˜t denote transfers and profits, while
It is investment used for the accumulation of physical capital















and investment specific stationary
productivity shock (µt).
4 δ is the depreciation rate and φI captures the severity of the real friction.















(1− τ t+1)RKt+1υt+1 − u (υt+1)
}




























3This is the shock that Smets and Wouters (2007) call a reduced-form net-worth shock.
4Although it is not stated explicitly, we follow the literature and we assume that households have access to Arrow-
Debru security that individual consumption risks and give rise to a unique budge constraint.
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2.2 Wages
We follow Erceg et al. (2000) and assume that each monopolistically competitive household supplies
a differentiated labour service to the production section. They set their nominal wage and supply any
amount of labour demanded by the firms at that wage rate. For convenience, we assume that there
exist a representative firm that combines households’ labour inputs into a homogenous input hood -









where λw is the mark-up in the labour market. Taking wt and wκ,t as given the aggregator’s demand for
























In each period, a function – 1 − ξw – of households receive a random signal and they are allowed
to reset wages optimally – wnewt . All other households can only partially index their wages by past
































































































Again there is a continuum of intermediate producers that employ labour and capital services to







a product that is bought by the final producer. αt is a stationary productivity shock, while Z˜t is
the stochastic trend and φ is the capital share. Intermediate producers operate in two stages, firstly,
they take wage and rental rate of capital a given and decide about labour and capital demand by
maximising their profits5
























intermediate firms receive a random signal and they are allowed to optimally reset their prices – pnewi,t .
The proportion – ξp – of firms that cannot reoptimise prices will set pt based on backward-looking
rule
Pt = (Πt−1)κp Π1−κpPt−1 (34)
where pit =
pt









































5Again we follow the literature and assume that capital is distributed across firms so they all face the same marginal
cost.
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Fiscal authorities finance government consumption and transfers by rising revenues from taxation and
































As it is discussed in Leeper (1991), a fiscal authority is characterised as ‘passive’ when it sets taxes in
a way that ‘restores’ debt back to its steady sate value. This is achieved by setting ζτ greater than
ΠΓ
β − 1. When authorities’ tax reaction function does not satisfy the latter condition (ζτ < ΠΓβ − 1),
then they actively destabilise the debt.













Similarly, the monetary policy is considered as passive if the policy rate does not respond to changes
in the inflation strong enough to stabilise inflation expectations (γpi < 1). When γpi > 1 monetary
policy is viewed as active since it guarantees that the long run inflation expectation coincide with the
inflation target.
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2.5 Market Clearing Conditions






























































































Similar to Swanson (2015), an equity security is defined as a levered claim on the aggregate con-
sumption. As it is explained Swanson (2015), this choice is motivated by the fact it maximises te
comparability to the finance literature (Campbell and Cochrane (1999), Campbell (2003)). Every
period, the equity pays a dividend equal to cϑt where ϑ captures the degree of leverage. In this case






where mt is the stochastic discount factor.
2.7 Calibrated Parameters
The model is estimated using full information Bayesian Maximum Likelihoood technique, however, a
small number of structural parameters – summarised by Table2– is actually calibrated prior to the
estimation of the model. To be precise, the share of capital in the production (φ) and its depreciation
rate (δ) have been calibrated to 0.36 and 0.025, numbers typically used in the literature (Christiano
et al. (2005), Trabandt and Uhlig (2011) and Jermann and Quadrini (2012)). As in Smets and
Wouters (2007) we assume that steady-state price (λp) and wage (λw) markups are equal to 20%. The
calibration of the steady state value of the debt to GDP ration (BY = 0.35), average tax rate (τ = 0.20)
and government spending to GDP ratio(GY = 0.18) is based on the studies of Leeper et al. (2010),
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Table 2: Calibrated Parameters
Mnemonic Description Value
σL Inverse Labour Supply Elasticity 1.00
β Time Discount Factor 0.99
φ Capital Share 0.36
δ Capital Depreciation Rate 0.03
τ Steady State Tax Rate to GDP Ratio 0.20
λp Steady State Price Markup 1.20
L Steady State Hours 0.33
G
Y Steady State Government Spending to GDP Ratio 0.18
λw Steady State Wage Markup 1.20
B
Y Steady State Debt to GDP Ratio 0.35
ϑ Degree of Leverage 3.00
Traum and Yang (2011) and Smets and Wouters (2007). The degree of leverage (ϑ) is set equal to 3
similar to Bansal and Yaron (2004), Campbell et al. (2014) and Swanson (2015). Finally, the values
the time discount factor (β = 0.99), the steady state value of hours (L = 1/3) and the (inverse) labour
supply elasticity (σL = 1) are common choices in the literature.
2.8 Prior Distributions
Table 3 summarise the prior density probability function of the estimated parameters. Again, these
choices are in line with those used in the literature ( Smets and Wouters (2007), Justiniano et al.
(2010),Traum and Yang (2011) among others) and we do not discuss them further here. It is perhaps
worthwhile to mentioned that the specification of the prior distribution of γpi and ζτ permits (fiscal
and monetary) policies to be either active or passive.
In addition, we follow Del Negro and Schorfheide (2008), Liu et al. (2013) and Christiano et al. (2011)
(among others) and form our priors ‘endogenously’. This requires another set of ‘priors’ that reflect
our beliefs regarding selected data moments. These moments are the responses of the set of the
observable variables on a government spending shock. This approach offers a natural way to link the
SVAR results with the DSGE analysis as the data counterpart of these moments are those estimated
by the identified VAR model.
As explained in Del Negro and Schorfheide (2008), eliciting priors are derived by combining Bayesian
techniques and calibration approaches. This intuitive approach formalises the decisions most re-
searchers make when deciding the prior moments of the estimated structural parameters. We briefly
outline the main idea here , though interested readers are advised to explore the preceding references.
Let M(θ) denote a vector of DSGE model-implied data moments (expressed as function of the struc-
tural parameters vector θ) and M̂ its empirical counterpart. Let us further assume that two vectors
of moments are the same up to a vector of measurement errors V
M̂ =M(θ) + V (50)
Then, as explained in Del Negro and Schorfheide (2008), a conditional distribution that reflects the
beliefs about the above moment conditions can be obtained by combining the conditional density of
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Table 3: Estimated Parameters: Prior Moments
Mnemonic Description Density Mean STD
100log(Π) Inflation Target Gamma 0.50 0.10
100γ Steady State Growth Trend Normal 0.50 0.03
h Consumption Smoothing Beta 0.50 0.10
φI Investment Adjustment Cost Gamma 4.00 1.00
ξp Calvo Price No Reset Probability Beta 0.66 0.10
ιp Price Indexation Beta 0.50 0.15
ξw Calvo Wage No Reset Probability Beta 0.66 0.10
ιw Wage Indexation Beta 0.50 0.15
κ2 Utilisation Cost Elasticity Gamma 5.00 1.00
ζτ Tax Debt to GDP Ration Reaction Gamma 0.10 0.05
ρR Policy Rate Smoothing Beta 0.50 0.20
γpi Policy Reaction to Inflation Normal 1.25 0.25
γy Policy Reaction to Output Gamma 0.12 0.05
ρτ Tax Persistence Beta 0.50 0.20
ρg Government Spending Persistence Beta 0.50 0.20
ργ Persistence Non-Stationary Growth Productivity Process Beta 0.50 0.20
ρψ Persistence Risk Premium Process Beta 0.50 0.20
ρα Persistence Stationary Productivity Process Beta 0.50 0.20
ρχ Persistence Labour Supply Process Beta 0.50 0.20
ρµ Persistence Investment Specific Process Beta 0.50 0.20
σg Government Spending Uncertainty Inv-Gamma 0.10 2.00
σγ STD Non-Stationary Growth Productivity Process Inv-Gamma 0.10 2.00
σψ STD Policy Exogenous Process Inv-Gamma 0.10 2.00
σα STD Stationary Productivity Process Inv-Gamma 0.10 2.00
σχ STD Labour Supply Process Inv-Gamma 0.10 2.00
σµ STD Investment Specific Process Inv-Gamma 0.10 2.00
σR STD Risk Premium Process Inv-Gamma 0.10 2.00
















There are several advantages of using this type of prior. For instance, as we can infer from (51),
structural parameters are no longer treated as independent, as is typically assumed in the DSGE
literature. Furthermore, shock processes are unobserved variables which makes it difficult to justify
beliefs regarding the persistence and the volatility of these exogenous processes. In this setup this is
not a problem, since these prior moments adjust endogenously to ‘match’ the selected data moments.
Finally, the empirical application in Del Negro and Schorfheide (2008) suggests that these priors can
be helpful when DSGE parameters are not well identified.
In our exercise the small size of the two sub-samples impose further, and perhaps more severe, con-
straints on the estimation of the theoretical model that we hope that these could be alleviated by
the prior information summarised in the vector of responses to a government spending shock (M(θ)).
Consistently with the asymptotic theory (Newey and McFadden (1986), Theodoridis (2011)) and other
researchers (Christiano et al. (2005), Christiano et al. (2010), Christiano et al. (2016)), we assume
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thatM(θ)i,j is normally distributed with mean M̂i,j and standard deviation 0.1σM̂i,j . The estimated






Clearly, these probability distributions are ‘shrunken’ around the estimated mean and this reflects the
fact that all the SVAR models considered in the previous section lead to the same conclusion. In other
words, our tight prior distributions echo the robust SVAR evidence about the effect of a government
spending shock on macro and financial variables.6
2.9 Posterior Estimation
Table 4: Estimated Parameters: Posterior Moments
1955Q4− 1979Q4 1980Q1− 2007Q4
Mnemonic Mode 5th 95th Mode 5th 95th
100log (Π) 0.503 0.347 0.672 0.506 0.341 0.680
100γ 0.498 0.450 0.538 0.478 0.431 0.531
h 0.532 0.466 0.661 0.690 0.643 0.746
φI 3.112 2.386 4.777 6.151 5.632 9.017
ξp 0.856 0.835 0.874 0.936 0.921 0.940
ιp 0.212 0.121 0.361 0.055 0.022 0.105
ξw 0.808 0.779 0.850 0.825 0.772 0.867
ιw 0.696 0.515 0.860 0.457 0.294 0.718
κ2 4.682 3.253 6.460 4.662 3.144 6.442
ζτ 0.009 0.003 0.017 0.063 0.026 0.076
ρR 0.718 0.647 0.791 0.705 0.720 0.806
γpi 0.480 0.365 0.581 1.618 1.498 1.866
γy 0.096 0.079 0.123 0.039 0.028 0.075
ρτ 0.504 0.162 0.823 0.528 0.200 0.864
ρg 0.765 0.741 0.785 0.999 0.999 0.999
ργ 0.261 0.136 0.417 0.121 0.033 0.213
ρψ 0.943 0.886 0.968 0.996 0.991 0.999
ρα 0.814 0.751 0.862 0.881 0.819 0.917
ρχ 0.989 0.977 0.993 0.977 0.961 0.989
ρµ 0.779 0.632 0.849 0.542 0.414 0.739
σg 3.497 3.091 4.025 2.724 2.381 2.995
σγ 0.552 0.491 0.644 0.695 0.642 0.809
σψ 0.417 0.325 0.668 0.147 0.115 0.205
σα 0.898 0.794 1.043 0.662 0.607 0.756
σχ 1.566 1.161 2.986 7.250 6.408 9.935
σµ 2.688 1.994 4.417 5.956 4.051 8.614
σR 0.201 0.181 0.233 0.238 0.161 0.207
Table 4 reports from the estimation of the DSGE model over the two sub-samples (1955Q4− 1979Q4
and 1980Q1−2015Q4).7 The vector of the observable variables is the one used by Smets and Wouters
6The decrease of the estimated variance is our ‘brute force’ approach to eliminate estimation uncertainty.
7The estimation of the model has been carried out using Dynare 4.4.3. The Dynare endogenous prior function has
been modified to implement the procedure discussed in the previous section. All the codes can be downloaded from
authors’ web page.
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(2007), namely, GDP growth, consumption growth, investment growth, real wage growth, average
hours, inflation and the policy rate.8
Although the split of the sample is based on prior information related to changes in the presidency of
the FED (see Cogley et al. (2010), Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) among others), there are many studies
in the literature (Traum and Yang (2011), Leeper et al. (2015), Kliem et al. (2016) among others) that
adopt a very similar sub-sample analysis to investigate simultaneous changes in the preferences of both
fiscal and monetary authorities. Furthermore, the studies of Bianchi and Ilut (2014) and Bianchi and
Melosi (2017) seem to justify empirically a very similar split of the data. Their methodology allows
the policy parameters to evolve stochastically from one regime to another. Although the process that
‘drives’ these switches is unobserved, it can be inferred from the data by using filtering techniques.
This analysis reveals that the time period of changes in the policy parameters seems to coincide with
the split of the sample adopted in the literature.
Table 4 reveals a very interesting pattern, monetary policy turns from ‘passive’ in the first part of the
sample to ‘active’ in the second part of the sample. This change is associated with a ‘flatter’ Philips
curve (resetting prices less frequently and less degree of indexation), which would be consistent with
the view that inflation expectations are better ‘anchored’ between 1980Q1− 2015Q4. Similarly, fiscal
policy also switches from ‘active’ in period 1955Q4 − 1979Q4 to ‘passive’ in the second part of the
sample. This result is consistent with the analysis of Bianchi and Ilut (2014) and Bianchi and Melosi
(2017) who also provide evidence about the switch between passive-monetary & active-fiscal policy
regime to active-monetary & passive-fiscal policy regime around the same time period.
The rest of the estimates fall well in the range of parameters reported in the literature (Christiano
et al. (2005), Smets and Wouters (2007), Justiniano et al. (2010), Del Negro et al. (2015) among
others) and, therefore, not discussed again here.9
2.10 Sensitivity to Prior Distributions
This section illustrates that the results are not ‘sensitive’ to the specification of (52). The sub sam-
ple estimation of the DSGE model is also carried out in this section, however, the specification of






Table 5 and Figures 1 - 2 reveal only marginal changes in the posterior distribution of the structural
parameter vector and agents’ optimal responses to a government spending shock.
8The definitions of the series is the same, we have simply updated Smets and Wouters (2007) spreadsheet till 2015Q4.
9The model has not been linearised around a deterministic steady-state and the structural disturbances have not
been normalised like those in the above mentioned studies and this explains why the standard deviation estimates are
different.
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Table 5: Estimated Parameters: Posterior Moments (Loser Prior)
1955Q4− 1979Q4 1980Q1− 2007Q4
Mnemonic Mode 5th 95th Mode 5th 95th
100log (Π) 0.501 0.354 0.698 0.500 0.343 0.665
100γ 0.499 0.454 0.545 0.484 0.439 0.537
h 0.548 0.488 0.686 0.660 0.610 0.720
φI 3.571 2.671 5.210 5.549 4.829 8.378
ξp 0.874 0.851 0.897 0.934 0.916 0.939
ιp 0.147 0.078 0.273 0.059 0.026 0.117
ξw 0.832 0.802 0.873 0.823 0.787 0.876
ιw 0.612 0.419 0.812 0.513 0.332 0.759
κ2 4.686 3.324 6.467 4.677 3.270 6.427
ζτ 0.010 0.004 0.018 0.046 0.024 0.046
ρR 0.700 0.630 0.797 0.706 0.728 0.816
γpi 0.557 0.395 0.683 1.695 1.562 1.907
γy 0.101 0.081 0.133 0.061 0.057 0.127
ρτ 0.503 0.177 0.844 0.504 0.180 0.866
ρg 0.782 0.755 0.811 0.998 0.998 0.998
ργ 0.242 0.121 0.394 0.119 0.029 0.202
ρψ 0.949 0.892 0.972 0.995 0.987 0.999
ρµ 0.776 0.628 0.850 0.622 0.571 0.862
ρα 0.833 0.761 0.881 0.881 0.804 0.916
ρχ 0.987 0.972 0.992 0.976 0.963 0.989
σg 3.497 3.075 4.030 2.715 2.394 2.969
σγ 0.546 0.487 0.632 0.698 0.639 0.799
σψ 0.368 0.286 0.653 0.177 0.140 0.231
σµ 2.999 2.306 5.063 4.856 2.906 6.601
σα 0.876 0.774 1.023 0.661 0.595 0.749
σχ 2.107 1.443 4.506 6.813 5.525 9.484
σR 0.202 0.177 0.233 0.234 0.154 0.198
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Notes: The solid line represents the pointwise median impulse response function, and the shaded area is the
corresponding 5th and 95th percentiles of the posterior distribution. The horizontal axes are in quarters, the





, and the present value multiplier




































































































Notes: The solid line represents the pointwise median impulse response function, and the shaded area is the
corresponding 5th and 95th percentiles of the posterior distribution. The horizontal axes are in quarters, the
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Rkt Rental Rate of Capital




F1,t Price Philips Curve Numerator
F2,t Philips Curve Denominator







vt Wage Philips Curve
TRt Transfers
Γt Productivity Growth




pˆit Inflation Log Deviation from SS
Rˆt Policy Rate
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Table 7: Endogenous Variables: B
Mnemonic Description
cˆt Consumption Log Deviation from SS
iˆt Investment Log Deviation from SS
qˆFt Equity Price Log Deviation from SS
gˆt Government Spending Log Deviation from SS
rˆt Real Rate from SS
ψt Risk Premium Exogenous Process
λp,t Price Markup Exogenous Process
λw,t Wage Markup Exogenous Process
µt Investment Specific Productivity Exogenous Process
wˆt Wage Log Deviation from SS
∆yˆt Output Growth Log Deviation from SS
∆cˆt Consumption Growth Log Deviation from SS
∆iˆt Investment Growth Log Deviation from SS
∆wˆt Wage Growth Log Deviation from SS
lˆt Average Hours Log Deviation from SS
∆gˆt Government Consumption Growth Log Deviation from SS
̂TaxRevt Tax Revenues
∆̂TaxRevt Tax Revenues Growth Log Deviation from SS
∆bˆt Government Debt Growth Log Deviation from SS
αt Stationary Productivity Process
θp,t MA Price Markup Process
θw,t MA Wage Markup Process
qc,t Consumption Equity Price
Rc,t Consumption Equity Return
qˆc,t Consumption Equity Price Log Deviation from SS
RL,t Long Term Interest Rate
p¯it Inflation Target Process
pˆiA,t CPI Annual Inflation
χt Labour Supply Process
Table 8: Exogenous Variables
Mnemonic Description
g,t Government Spending Shock
γ,t Non Stationary Productivity Shock
ψ,t Risk Premium Shock
R,t Monetary Policy Shock
µ,t Investment Specific Productivity Shock
χ,t Labour Supply Shock
α,t Stationary Productivity Shock
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t−1 exp (σα α,t) (138)
χt = χ
ρχ
t−1 exp (σχ χ,t) (139)
qc,t =
β λt+1
Γt λt
(
Cϑt+1 + qc,t+1
)
(140)
Rc,t =
qc,t + C
ϑ
t
qc,t−1
(141)
qˆc,t = log
(
qc,t
qc
)
(142)
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